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Sidestepping Deference: How United States v. Ressam 
Encourages Overly Stringent Review of Sentencing 
Decisions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Ressam, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 
sentence imposed on Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian national convicted 
in a terror plot to plant explosives at the Los Angeles International 
Airport (“LAX”) on New Year’s Eve 1999.1 Reviewing district court-
issued sentences requires appellate courts to give the sentencing 
decisions “substantial deference” without rendering appellate review 
an “empty exercise.”2 Defining this balance, the Supreme Court in 
Gall v. United States directed appellate courts to examine all 
sentences—inside and outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”) range—for both procedural error and substantive 
reasonableness, using the abuse-of-discretion standard.3  
In Ressam, a three-judge panel, by a two-to-one majority, 
vacated Ressam’s below-Guidelines sentence because the majority 
determined that the sentencing judge committed procedural error.4 
This Note argues that the majority failed to apply the abuse-of-
discretion standard with appropriate deference to the trial judge’s 
sentence.5 The Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of the standard to 
review for procedural error more closely resembled a searching de 
novo review; consequently, the rigorous review to which the majority 
subjected the district court’s sentence led it to wrongly detect 
procedural error and vacate the sentence.6 Further, this Note argues 
that the decision’s reasoning equips appellate courts with tools that 
could inappropriately encourage them to use an outcome-driven 
 
 1. 593 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). 
 3. 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “abuse of discretion” as 
“[a]n appellate court’s standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, 
unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 11 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 4. Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1098, 1099. 
 5. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 56. 
 6. See Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1122–23, 1133–34. 
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analysis to encroach on traditional district court sentencing authority 
and vacate sentences with which the appellate courts disagree.7 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian national, traveled from France to 
Montreal in 1994 “using an illegally altered French passport.”8 
Although Canadian authorities intercepted him, “[a] moratorium on 
deportations from Canada to Algeria” permitted Ressam to remain 
in Canada.9 In 1998 he traveled to Afghanistan under a fake name 
and underwent terrorist training in light weapons, explosives, 
sabotage, and urban warfare.10 He returned to Canada in 1999 
under directions to attack American interests before the end of the 
year; he chose to target LAX, one of the busiest American airports.11 
In November 1999, Ressam traveled from Montreal to British 
Columbia, where he prepared explosives for the LAX bomb and hid 
them along with other explosive components in the wheel well of a 
rental car’s trunk.12 He then entered the United States with the 
rental car via ferry from British Columbia to Port Angeles, 
Washington.13 When customs inspectors searched the car upon his 
arrival in Port Angeles, Ressam fled and “attempted to carjack a 
vehicle” before the inspectors apprehended him and discovered the 
hidden explosives.14  
After a jury convicted him on “nine counts relating to his 
attempt to carry out an act of terrorism transcending a national 
boundary,” Ressam agreed to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement 
officers investigating terror-related activities in exchange for a 
potential downward adjustment of his sentence.15 Ressam provided 
information leading to a twenty-four-year prison sentence for 
Mokhtar Hauoari, one of Ressam’s co-conspirators,16 and the 
 
 7. See id. at 1134–35 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 1099 (majority opinion). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1099–1100. 
 11. Id. at 1100–01. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 1101. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1101–02; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2009). 
 16. Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1102–03; see also United States v. Haouari, S4-00-cr-15, 2001 
WL 1154714 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001). 
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capture and detention at Guantanamo Bay of Ahcene Zemiri, 
another of his collaborators.17 His cooperation buttressed U.S. 
Attorney complaints against Abu Doha—“a major player in the arena 
of terrorist activity”—and Samir Ait Mohamed, another of Ressam’s 
accomplices.18 Ressam also identified Zacarias Moussaoui, one of the 
9/11 perpetrators, as a trainee at an Afghan terrorist camp and 
helped identify the “Shoe Bomber” Richard Reid’s bomb as “a 
complete device that needed to be disarmed for transport to a lab for 
analysis.”19 However, Ressam ultimately recanted much of his 
testimony and refused to cooperate further.20 This led to the 
dismissal of charges against Abu Doha and Samir Ait Mohamed.21  
The district court sentenced Ressam in July 2005 to twenty-two 
years of imprisonment.22 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
conviction on one count and vacated Ressam’s sentence,23 after 
which the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 
and remanded the case.24 The appellate court again vacated the 
sentence and remanded the case, this time because the district court 
had not established the appropriate Guidelines range as required by a 
Ninth Circuit case decided during the appeals process of Ressam.25 
In December 2008, the district court resentenced Ressam to twenty-
two years in prison followed by five years of supervised release. The 
Guideline minimum for Ressam’s offenses, however, is sixty-five 
years.26 As justification for the departure from the Guidelines 
minimum, the judge cited Ressam’s cooperation and the personal 
risk it entailed, his confinement conditions, and his mental and 
physical health together with his life history and personal 
characteristics.27 
 
 17. Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1108. 
 18. Id. at 1100, 1103. 
 19. Id. at 1103. 
 20. Id. at 1106, 1108–09. 
 21. Id. at 1111. 
 22. Id. at 1107. 
 23. United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 272 
(2008). 
 24. United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272 (2008). 
 25. United States v. Ressam, 538 F.3d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 26. Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1112–14, 1124. 
 27. Id. at 1112–14. 
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III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
At issue in this case is whether Ressam’s below-Guidelines 
sentence was procedurally erroneous. District courts must ensure 
that the sentences they impose meet certain requirements in order to 
pass appellate scrutiny.28 Appellate courts review such sentences 
under the deferential abuse-of-discretion review standard,29 dividing 
their assessment into two parts: review for procedural error and 
review for substantive reasonableness.30 They approach each part 
differently.31 This section will examine review for procedural error. 
Relevant distinctions between reviewing for procedural error and 
substantive reasonableness will be analyzed in Part V.B. 
A. Procedural Criteria for District Court Sentencing 
The Supreme Court in Gall v. United States delineated 
guidelines a district court should follow to reach a procedurally 
sound sentence: the court should (1) “correctly calculat[e] the 
appropriate Guidelines range,” (2) “remain cognizant of [it] 
throughout the sentencing process,” (3) avoid basing the sentence 
on clearly erroneous facts, and (4) sufficiently explain any variance 
from the Guidelines range32 or reasons for rejecting the parties’ 
nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a different sentence.33 District 
courts must also consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).34 These include the history and characteristics of the 
defendant, the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the 
law, providing just punishment, adequately deterring criminal 
conduct, protecting the public from the defendant, and providing 
the defendant with effective correctional treatment.35 Although 
 
 28. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007). 
 29. Id. at 51. 
 30. United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 31. See id. (reasoning that review for substantive reasonableness assesses the weight 
accorded to particular sentencing factors, while procedural soundness review inquires only as to 
whether such factors were considered); see also, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (distinguishing 
between the discrete, concrete criteria procedurally sound sentences must satisfy and the 
general requirement that substantively reasonable sentences must be justified by the “totality of 
the circumstances”). 
 32. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51, 50 n.6. 
 33. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). 
 34. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
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sentencing judges may exercise discretion in the “brevity or . . . 
conciseness” with which they address these criteria,36 sentences 
outside the Guidelines range typically require “sufficiently 
compelling” justification.37 
B. Abuse-of-Discretion: The Proper Standard for Appellate Review of 
District Court Sentences 
Prior to 2003, appellate courts reviewed sentences both inside 
and outside the appropriate Guidelines range under an abuse-of-
discretion standard as the Supreme Court stipulated in Koon v. 
United States.38 Congress, however, overruled Koon in 200339 and 
mandated that appellate courts employ a de novo standard of review 
for outside-Guidelines sentences.40 But in 2005, United States v. 
Booker rendered advisory the once-mandatory Guidelines, excised the 
de novo review requirement, and redirected appellate courts to the 
pre-2003 practice of reviewing outside-Guidelines sentences for 
“reasonableness” in light of the § 3553(a) factors.41 Gall explained 
that it is “pellucidly clear” that “reasonableness” review equates with 
abuse-of-discretion review.42 
The standard is substantially deferential.43 Gall, for instance, 
prohibits appellate courts from presuming that outside-Guidelines 
sentences are unreasonable44 and precludes them from reversing a 
sentence because they “might reasonably have concluded that a 
different sentence was appropriate.”45 Additionally, Gall rejects 
insufficiently deferential review practices such as “requir[ing] 
‘extraordinary’ circumstances” to justify an outside-Guidelines 
 
 36. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. 
 37. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50; see also United States v. Leyva-Ortiz, 325 F. App’x 710, 715 
(10th Cir. 2009) (noting that an outside-Guidelines sentence requires a “more specific” 
explanation than a within-Guidelines sentence, not necessarily a more “extensive” 
explanation). 
 38. See 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). 
 39. Rita, 551 U.S. at 361 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 41. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–61; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (“Regardless of whether 
the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review 
the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
 42. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. 
 43. See id. at 47, 51. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 51. 
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sentence or employing “a rigid mathematical formula” to determine 
the necessary strength of justification for an outside-Guidelines 
sentence; these approaches “come too close to creating an 
impermissible presumption of unreasonableness” for such 
sentences.46 
Abuse of discretion, moreover, is not a “monolithic standard.”47 
Its broad parameters encompass sub-standards used to assess 
particularized issues.48 For instance, appellate courts may remain 
within the abuse-of-discretion rubric while examining questions of 
law de novo, mixed matters of law and fact for abuse of discretion, 
and purely factual issues for clear error.49 In the context of 
sentencing review, questions of law include whether the district 
court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, mixed questions 
encompass the trial court’s application of the Guidelines to facts, and 
issues of straight fact involve the sentencing judge’s factual 
findings.50 
The Supreme Court appears to require the abuse-of-discretion 
standard for examination of both procedural soundness and 
substantive reasonableness, though it is not clear on this point.51 The 
Court stated in Gall that all sentences should be reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.52 However, the Court then discussed appellate review 
for procedural error without mentioning any particular standard.53 It 
went on to say that “appellate court[s] should then consider [the 
sentence’s] substantive reasonableness . . . under an abuse-of-
discretion standard,”54 intimating that the standard may apply only 
 
 46. Id. at 47. 
 47. United States v. Carrasco-de-Jesus, 589 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 48. See id. (noting that review under abuse-of-discretion requires de novo review for 
“embedded questions of law” and clear-error review for embedded questions of fact); see also 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“The abuse-of-discretion standard includes 
[de novo] review to determine that the [district court’s] discretion was not guided by erroneous 
legal conclusions.”). 
 49. See United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. 
at 51) (indicating that once an appellate court finds a sentence procedurally sound, it reviews 
for substantive reasonableness “under the same abuse of discretion rubric”). 
 52. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
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to substantive reasonableness review and not the initial procedural 
soundness inquiry.55 
The Ninth Circuit indeed determined in United States v. Grissom 
that Gall did not require a change to the circuit’s standard of review 
for sentencing decisions.56 Because Gall did not explicitly mandate 
the abuse-of-discretion standard for review of procedural soundness, 
the Grissom Court reasoned, it left “untouched the preexisting 
standards of review for questions of procedural reasonableness.”57 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s pre-Gall method of examining 
sentences for procedural reasonableness squared with the abuse-of-
discretion standard that other circuits employ to review both 
procedural soundness and substantive reasonableness.58 This method 
scrutinizes “the district court’s interpretation of the . . . Guidelines 
de novo, [its] application of the . . . Guidelines to the facts . . . for 
abuse of discretion, and [its] factual findings for clear error.”59 Thus, 
Grissom declares that only review for substantive reasonableness is 
subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard, but the standard it 
delineates for procedural soundness review nominally squares with 
abuse-of-discretion review.60 
 
 55. See Grissom, 525 F.3d at 696 n.2 (reading the holding of Gall as limited to 
substantive reasonableness and leaving intact the preexisting multi-level review standard for 
procedural error). 
 56. Id. at 696. 
 57. Id. at 696 n.2. 
 58. Compare United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1279 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(describing the abuse-of-discretion test applicable to procedural error review), with United 
States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 46) (noting that 
the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to each stage of the two-stage review process for 
procedural error and substantive reasonableness), United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 
(11th Cir. 2009) (same), United States v. Carrasco-de-Jesus, 589 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(noting that within the margins of the abuse-of-discretion standard questions of law receive de 
novo review and findings of fact receive clear-error review), and United States v. Martin, 520 
F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008) (indicating that review for substantive reasonableness occurs under 
“the same abuse of discretion rubric” as examination for procedural soundness). 
 59. Cantrell, 433 F.3d at 1279 (quoting United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149, 
1151 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 60. Compare Grissom, 525 F.3d at 696 (“Prior to Gall, we ‘review[ed] the district 
court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of 
the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s 
factual findings for clear error.’ We do not read Gall to change that practice.” (quoting 
Cantrell, 433 F.3d at 1279)), with Carrasco-de-Jesus, 589 F.3d at 27 (“[A]buse of discretion is 
not a monolithic standard.”). 
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IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit, reviewing for procedural soundness sua 
sponte, vacated Ressam’s sentence based on the following errors in 
the sentencing process: failure to properly consider the Guidelines, 
and failure to adequately address the government’s arguments 
regarding Ressam’s history and characteristics, the value of his 
cooperation with prosecutors, and the need for a longer sentence to 
adequately protect the public.61 
A. Framework for Reviewing Procedural Soundness 
Although the government’s challenge to Ressam’s sentence 
expressly disclaimed allegations of procedural error, the majority held 
as a threshold matter that Gall requires sua sponte appellate review 
for procedural error, even when the parties do not assert it.62 The 
court reasoned that review for substantive reasonableness without 
first having reviewed for procedural error would be “analytically 
problematic.”63 Further, it noted that a district court’s failure to 
adequately explain an outside-Guidelines sentence in a “complex or 
complicated case” such as Ressam,64 versus a “straight-forward” or 
“typical” case,65 constitutes procedural error.66 Relying on Gall, the 
majority then outlined a sufficient explanation for an outside-
Guidelines sentence in a complex case, including properly calculating 
and minding the Guidelines range, considering the § 3553(a) 
factors, avoiding erroneous factual conclusions, and sufficiently 
explaining the sentence.67 
B. Procedural Error in the District Court’s Sentencing Process 
Applying this framework, the majority noted four procedural 
errors in Ressam’s sentence.68 First, it held that the district court did 
 
 61. United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 1115–16, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 62. Id. at 1115–16. 
 63. Id. at 1116 (arguing that for appellate courts to review substantive reasonableness, 
they must first see district courts’ procedural steps). 
 64. Id. at 1117. 
 65. Id. at 1116–17 (quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993, 995 (9th Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. Id. at 1117. 
 67. Id. at 1117–20. 
 68. Id. at 1122–23. 
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not use the Guidelines as a starting point in its sentencing process 
because the sentencing judge believed the government’s pre-trial 
plea offer of a twenty-five-year sentence was a legally proper starting 
point for calculating the sentence.69 The court further determined 
that the sentencing judge did not mind the Guidelines throughout 
the sentencing process because he did not sufficiently justify the 
outside-Guidelines sentence; aside from two “passing references” 
that generally acknowledged divergence from the Guidelines, the 
judge did not explicitly address the degree of variance or why it was 
justified.70 
The second error concerned the district court’s valuation of 
Ressam’s assistance to prosecutors.71 The majority concluded that, 
contrary to the Guidelines, the sentencing judge gave no weight to 
the government’s evaluation of Ressam’s assistance, instead relying 
wholly on Ressam’s own assessment.72 The government argued that 
Ressam cooperated only when faced with a life sentence, provided 
information already available in classified form, undermined his own 
assistance by recanting much of it, and terminated his cooperation 
prematurely.73 Because the district court inadequately explained why 
it rejected the government’s arguments, the majority held that it 
could not determine whether the judge abused his discretion.74  
Third, the majority held to be “clearly erroneous” the district 
court’s factual finding that Ressam’s life and personal characteristics 
supported a favorable sentence.75 The majority determined that the 
record showed that “Ressam has lead [sic] a life of crime dedicated 
to terrorist causes,” and that the district court failed to address this 
and square it with its finding that Ressam’s “true character is 
manifest in his decision to cooperate.”76 
The fourth error was the district court’s failure to discuss the 
§ 3553(a) factor requiring sentences to protect the public from the 
 
 69. Id. at 1123. 
 70. Id. at 1123–25. 
 71. Id. at 1122–23. 
 72. Id. at 1126. 
 73. Id. at 1126–27. 
 74. Id. at 1125, 1128. 
 75. Id. at 1128. 
 76. Id. 
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defendant, which omission the majority found “particularly troubling 
[in this case] given the nature of Ressam’s crimes.”77 
C. Dissent 
Judge Fernandez contended in dissent that the district court’s 
“sentence was neither procedurally erroneous nor substantively 
unreasonable.”78 He suggested that the majority failed to accord 
sufficient deference to the district court’s sentence and, by doing so, 
improperly entered “territory . . . forbidden to [appellate courts],” 
swapping the sentencing judge’s decision with the majority’s own.79 
Because neither party had alleged procedural error, Judge Fernandez 
intimated that the court should have reviewed the sentence only for 
substantive reasonableness, and that even that should have been 
done “with a great deal of humility.”80 Even if review for procedural 
soundness had been appropriate, he noted that the district court 
“touched all of the procedural bases” and therefore committed no 
procedural error.81 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit panel majority erroneously vacated Ahmed 
Ressam’s twenty-two-year prison sentence82 by failing to review the 
procedural soundness of the sentence under the abuse-of-discretion 
standard.83 Although the Ressam majority purported to review for 
abuse of discretion,84 the court misapplied the standard by failing to 
proceed with the deference that the standard requires. This 
permitted the majority to ferret procedural error from the district 
court’s sentencing decision. Under a properly applied abuse-of-
discretion standard, the sentencing process satisfied all procedural 
requirements.85  
 
 77. Id. at 1129. 
 78. Id. at 1135 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 1134–35, 1134 n.1. 
 81. Id. at 1134. 
 82. Id. at 1099 (majority opinion). 
 83. See id. at 1122 (citing United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 & n.2 (9th Cir. 
2008)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 1134 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
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A. Ninth Circuit Sidesteps the Deferential Abuse-of-Discretion 
Standard 
The Ninth Circuit cited its decision in United States v. Grissom to 
establish the standard it employed in Ressam to examine procedural 
soundness.86 Maintaining that Gall explicitly designated the abuse-
of-discretion standard only for review of substantive reasonableness, 
the Grissom court suggested that procedural soundness review called 
for a standard different from the abuse-of-discretion standard used in 
review of substantive reasonableness.87 Nevertheless, each element of 
the standard corresponds with the abuse-of-discretion standard when 
appropriately conceived as a tiered standard of review depending on 
the question under consideration.  
The Ninth Circuit’s standard mandates de novo review of the 
district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines and clear-error review 
for factual findings.88 Similarly, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
appellate abuse-of-discretion review may include de novo review to 
examine district courts’ legal conclusions.89 The First Circuit agreed, 
observing that de novo review of questions of law, such as 
interpretations of the Guidelines, fall under the abuse-of-discretion 
standard.90 Further, it noted that clear-error review for factual 
findings is in harmony with abuse-of-discretion review.91 Regarding 
mixed questions of law and fact, such as district courts’ application of 
the Guidelines to facts, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the 
abuse-of-discretion standard applies.92 Thus the standard the Ressam 
majority pulled from Grissom and professed to employ for procedural 
soundness review equates with the deferential abuse-of-discretion 
standard.93  
But by misapplying the abuse-of-discretion standard in its review 
for procedural error,94 the majority sidestepped the substantial 
deference the standard requires for appellate sentence review.95 As a 
 
 86. Id. at 1121–22 (majority opinion) (citing Grissom, 525 F.3d at 696 & n.2). 
 87. Grissom, 525 F.3d at 696 & n.2. 
 88. Id. at 696. 
 89. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). 
 90. United States v. Carrasco-de-Jesus, 589 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Grissom, 525 F.3d at 696. 
 93. See United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 94. See id. at 1122. 
 95. See, e.g., Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62 
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result, the court overturned Ressam’s sentence even though it was 
not “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may 
be drawn from facts.”96 
Deference for district courts’ sentencing decisions is rooted in 
Supreme Court directives and district courts’ practical advantages in 
sentencing. For its part, the Supreme Court has in recent decisions 
enhanced district courts’ sentencing discretion.97 It has also 
recognized district courts’ “institutional advantage” in making 
sentencing decisions, due to their consistent exposure to Guidelines 
cases.98  
Additionally, district courts have traditionally been given wide 
latitude in the sentencing sphere. This deference is rooted in what 
one professor termed the “you are there” principle: trial judges are 
present to observe interpersonal dynamics between lawyers, 
witnesses, and juries.99 Appellate courts, on the other hand, do not 
see defendants, victims, or victims’ families testify at trial; nor are 
appellate judges typically experienced at sentencing.100 Conversely, 
district courts’ “ring-side perspective on the sentencing hearing and 
[their] experience over time in sentencing” grant them “comparative 
advantages” in sentencing over appellate courts.101 
When trial judges’ decisions are based on critical facts or 
circumstances “that the record imperfectly conveys,” as is typically 
the case in sentencing decisions, appellate courts should defer to 
 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115, 1157 (2008) (arguing that district courts possess “special expertise” 
in respect to sentencing decisions). 
 96. See Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1122 (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 
1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Booker 
empowered district courts, not appellate courts and not the Sentencing Commission. Talk of 
presumptions, plain error and procedural and substantive rules of review means nothing if it 
does not account for the central reality that Booker breathes life into the authority of district 
court judges to engage in individualized sentencing within reason in applying the § 3553(a) 
factors to the criminal defendants that come before them.”). Vonner pointed to four recent 
Supreme Court decisions that significantly bolstered the discretion of the district court judge 
in sentencing: Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005). 
 98. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). 
 99. Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 183 
(1978). 
 100. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 101. Id. at 351–52. 
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district courts’ conclusions.102 In light of these traditional policies 
and standards, the standard the Ressam majority actually used to 
examine Ressam’s sentence for procedural error failed to accord the 
district court the deference it should have received under a properly 
applied abuse-of-discretion standard.  
B. Inadequately Deferential Review Standard Yields Errant Findings 
of Procedural Error 
Illustrating the stringency of its review standard, the Ressam 
majority was able to review for procedural soundness only because it 
incorrectly held that appellate courts have a “duty” to review for 
procedural error sua sponte, even when neither party raises the issue 
on appeal.103 This holding is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit 
precedent104 and is based on an errant reading of Gall, which 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s directive to “first” review for 
procedural error as a requirement to always do so.105 The Ninth 
Circuit in Ressam thus erred by ruling, contrary to its own prior 
practice, that appellate courts must review for procedural error 
whether or not it is alleged. 
The misapplied review standard also resulted in errant findings of 
procedural error in the district court’s sentencing process. The 
majority wrongly concluded that the sentencing judge “failed to use 
the Guidelines as a starting point” in the sentencing process and did 
not “‘remain cognizant’ of [the Guidelines] throughout the 
process.”106 Because the sentencing judge merely calculated the 
 
 102. Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 183 (contending that trial judges’ rulings deserve 
“substantial” respect “whenever [they are] based on facts or circumstances that are critical to 
decision and that the record imperfectly conveys”). 
 103. See United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 104. See United States v. Paul, 561 F.3d 970, 974 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing only 
for substantive reasonableness because “no one contends that the original sentence was 
procedurally invalid”); United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(addressing procedural soundness with one sentence because “neither party challeng[ed] the 
[sentence’s] procedural soundness”); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 
2008) (avoiding the issue of procedural soundness where neither party alleged procedural 
error). 
 105. See Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1115–16; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007) (“[The appellate court] must first ensure that the district court committed no 
significant procedural error . . . . Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is 
procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of 
the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
 106. Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6). 
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Guidelines range at the outset of the sentencing hearing and 
referenced it only twice more “in passing,” the majority held that he 
“did not appear to give any weight whatsoever to the Guidelines 
range.”107 
Yet the judge’s treatment of the Guidelines fulfilled the legal 
requirements of the sentencing process.108 He calculated the 
Guidelines range, which neither party claimed he did incorrectly.109 
He used the range as a starting point and initial benchmark and 
remained cognizant of it during the sentencing process, as reflected 
by his proper calculation of the range at the outset and his two 
references to the Guidelines during the hearing. In fact, he expressly 
acknowledged that “the sentence I am imposing reflects a significant 
downward deviation from the advisory guideline range,” which he 
found to be justified by the § 3553(a) factors.110 In the absence of 
guidance for how a trial judge “remain[s] cognizant” of the 
Guidelines range, the Ressam district court’s initial Guidelines 
calculation and final recognition of deviation should be sufficient to 
infer that the judge “remained cognizant” of the Guidelines range 
throughout the sentencing process. To hold otherwise would 
compel judges to render opinions riddled with unnecessary 
references to the Guidelines range.111 The district court thus 
“touched all of the procedural bases” relating to the Guidelines 
range.112 
Further, the district court considered each § 3553(a) factor and 
adequately articulated its reasoning for departing from the 
Guidelines range.113 Although sentencing judges must explain 
outside-Guidelines sentences sufficiently to allow “meaningful 
appellate review,”114 they need only provide enough explanation to 
show that they “considered the parties’ arguments” and have a 
 
 107. Id. at 1123 (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. at 1134 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 1114, 1123 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 111. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (“The appropriateness of 
brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon 
circumstances.”); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The district 
court need not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them.”). 
 112. See Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1134 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. 
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reasonable basis for the sentence.115 Here, the district court’s 
explanation demonstrated that it contemplated the parties’ 
contentions116 and adequately revealed the reasoning behind the 
reduced sentence; it cited as support Ressam’s cooperation leading to 
terrorist convictions, his confinement conditions, his life and 
characteristics, and the need to encourage other captured terrorists 
to cooperate.117 
The majority also cited the sentencing judge’s failure to address 
the government’s nonfrivolous arguments regarding the value of 
Ressam’s cooperation with law enforcement, the impact of his 
recantation, and the need for a longer sentence to protect the public 
as procedural error.118 It noted that “when a party raises a specific, 
nonfrivolous argument tethered to a relevant § 3553(a) factor in 
support of a requested sentence, then the judge should normally 
explain why he accepts or rejects the party’s position.”119 But the 
sentencing judge explained why he rejected the government’s 
arguments, recognizing that, although Ressam’s recantation 
“resulted in the dismissal of two pending prosecutions and the 
retraction of certain of his statements against two other terrorist 
suspects,” his “cooperation, while it lasted, provided the United 
States government and [other] governments . . . extensive 
intelligence that proved to be invaluable in the fight against 
international terrorism.”120 Further, although the judge “did not 
specifically discuss the need to protect the public, [he] did note that 
[he] had to consider this factor, and we have nothing to indicate that 
[he] did not do so.”121 
 
 115. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. 
 116.  Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1112–14 (majority opinion) (“[T]he seriousness and 
heinousness of the act of terrorism Mr. Ressam was carrying out at the time of his arrest cannot 
be understated. . . . Mr. Ressam’s extensive and valuable cooperation . . . ended unwisely and 
prematurely . . . . The Court recognizes that Mr. Ressam’s later decision to end his 
cooperation resulted in the dismissal of two pending prosecutions and the retraction of certain 
of his statements against two other terrorist suspects. . . . I believe that the sentence I am 
imposing today will serve as a deterrent . . . . Moreover, I have considered the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.” (citation omitted)). 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. at 1122–23. 
 119. Carty, 520 F.3d at 992–93 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 356). 
 120. Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1113. 
 121. Id. at 1134 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
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While the district court thus satisfied all the procedural criteria, 
the majority attempted to buttress its finding of error by departing 
from the test for procedural error. The majority took issue with the 
relative weight the district court gave to several of the sentencing 
considerations.122 But the weight a district court gives to specific 
procedural requirements should not be considered during review for 
the sentence’s procedural soundness. Rather, the weighing of 
procedural criteria should be examined during review for substantive 
reasonableness; examination for procedural error analyzes only 
whether a district court considered the requirements.123 Even then, 
one commentator has argued that appellate courts cross the 
“threshold of necessary deference” when they question how a district 
court weighed the § 3553(a) factors.124 The commentator further 
suggests that appellate courts should only reverse a sentence for 
substantive unreasonableness if it is “irrational or arbitrary,” 
inconsistent with the district court’s explanation thereof, “based on 
impermissible factors,” or issued without the district court having 
considered relevant § 3553(a) factors.125 Thus, under its own 
precedent, the Ninth Circuit should reverse only sentences that are 
illogical, illegal, or insupportable by inferences drawn from the 
facts.126 
Here, the sentence was logical, legal, and factually supported. 
The district court intended the below-Guidelines sentence to 
encourage other captured terrorists to emulate Ressam’s 
cooperation, which helped convict dangerous terrorism 
conspirators.127 The court also considered that Ressam’s harsh 
confinement circumstances may have worn on his health and 
 
 122. Id. at 1122–23, 1128–29 (majority opinion) (contesting the weight given the 
Guidelines range, the government’s evaluation of Ressam’s cooperation and his life and 
characteristics, and the § 3553(a) condition that sentences adequately protect the public). 
 123. United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52–55, 59 (2007)). 
 124. Harrison, supra note 95, at 1156. 
 125. Id. at 1154–56. 
 126. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (outlining the 
Ninth Circuit’s two-part “abuse of discretion” test, which first considers whether the district 
court identified the correct legal standard for the issue in question, and then decides whether 
the district court’s findings of fact and applications thereof to correct legal standards were 
“illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the 
record”). 
 127. Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1112–13. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 8:10 PM 
171 Sidestepping Deference 
 187 
contributed to his decision to terminate his assistance.128 Further, the 
government itself originally suggested a comparable sentence in light 
of Ressam’s prospective assistance.129 Thus, considering the 
substantial deference appellate courts must give district courts’ 
sentencing decisions,130 Ressam’s sentence was suitable based on the 
totality of the circumstances. 
VI. CONCLUSION: RAMIFICATIONS OF RESSAM 
The Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of the deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard to procedural soundness review in Ressam not 
only led to errant findings of procedural error,131 but also appears to 
encourage and equip appellate courts to reverse sentences with which 
they disagree. For instance, Ressam invites appellate courts to 
examine sentences more closely than even the appellant wishes by 
requiring review for procedural error whether or not the parties 
allege it.132 District courts’ assurances that they considered each 
§ 3553(a) factor are insufficient to avoid procedural error under 
Ressam, even though district courts are ostensibly not required to 
“tick off” each factor as they consider it.133 The court also removed a 
key distinction between procedural and substantive review when it 
reviewed for procedural soundness by examining the weight the 
district court gave to the § 3553(a) factors.134 
These less deferential means of sentence review undercut Gall’s 
maxim that reviewing courts may not reverse merely because they 
would have chosen a different sentence.135 Moreover, they run 
counter to traditional notions of the deference due a trial judge and 
the Supreme Court’s recent theme of enhancing that deference in 
the context of sentencing review.136 In sum, the majority’s refusal to 
 
 128. See id. at 1106, 1113. The government argued that the district court erred in 
crediting Ressam’s psychiatrist’s assessment that Ressam’s confinement conditions negatively 
affected his mental health, which prevented him from remembering details and ultimately led 
to his ceasing cooperation. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1106–07 (noting that the United States Attorney offered Ressam a pre-trial 
plea offer of twenty-five years in prison). 
 130. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). 
 131. See Ressam, 593 F.3d at 1099. 
 132. Id. at 1115–16. 
 133. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 134. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 136. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 8:10 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
188 
apply the abuse-of-discretion standard to procedural soundness 
review enabled the court to find nonexistent procedural error and 
erroneously vacate Ressam’s sentence. This decision is inconsistent 
with the appellate deference owed to district courts’ sentencing 
decisions and thereby wrongly encourages appeals courts to engage 
in outcome-based analysis to defeat sentences with which they 
disagree. 
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